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'BRUCE L. HAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Who should bear the burden of proof in an adversarial dispute? Consider the
following  hypothetical case. A  sues B, seeking  some relief. There exists some
information (evidence) indicating whether A has a valid claim against B, but the
court can only acquire the information if  it is presented by one of the parties.
Who, as between the parties, should have to present the information? Should A
be required to demonstrate that she is entitled to recover from B? Or should B be
required to demonstrate that A is not entitled to recover from B?
This problem arises in any setting in which a person or group is given authority
to  adjudicate  disputes.  Examples  include  not  only  courts  and  arbitration
tribunals, but also firms with internal grievance procedures.  In these settings and
others,  two  features suffice to raise the burden of proof problem: (1)  relief is
granted or denied based on the facts  of the dispute;I  and (2) the  adjudicator
depends at least in part on the parties to come forward with information about the
facts.2
In  this  Article,  I  analyze  this  problem  with  a  model  of litigation  that
incorporates  the  decision  to  file  suit,  the  decision  to  present  evidence  in
adjudication, and the possibility of an out-of-court settlement. My objective is
to see how the burden of proof should be allocated, where the social objective
is to minimize the total social costs associated with dispute resolution-which
encompass  both the  costs of processing  disputes and the  costs  of erroneous
outcomes. Using the model, I attempt to describe parties'  equilibrium behavior
under different burden of proof allocations, and then to assess the optimal burden
of allocation  in  light of this  behavior.'  In  addition,  I  attempt to  identify  the
features of a case that favor putting the burden on one party or the other, and to
explain some of the principal burden of proof allocation rules found in practice.
The  analysis  proceeds  in  three basic  stages.  In  the first,  I  pose  a  simple
question: why would we ever assign the burden  of proof to the plaintiff in a
*  Harvard Law School. I thank Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell for their comments on
an earlier version.
1. As contrasted, say, with a system in which the parties are made to split the difference
in every case (or in which the dispute is resolved by flipping a coin, by jousting, or by reference
to some other criterion unrelated to the facts).
2. As compared to a system in which the adjudicator takes all responsibility for gathering
the facts, with the parties playing a passive role.
3. The model employed here builds on a separate project in which Kathryn Spier and I
examine the use of burdens of proof to minimize the costs of resolving a dispute that has been
brought to court. See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of  Proof  in Civil Litigation:
An Economic Perspective,  26 J. LEGAL STUD.  (forthcoming, summer 1997). The present model
focuses on three elements not explicitly considered in the other project: (1) the decision to sue;
(2) the possibility of settlement out of court;  and (3) litigant uncertainty concerning the merit
of a claim. As the analysis to follow will make clear, a consideration of these elements is
critical to understanding the effects and optimal use of the burden of proof.INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
dispute? In practice, of course, the plaintiff is almost always assigned the burden
of proof; the apparent justification for this is that it conserves legal resources  by
ensuring  that  the law's  "cumbrous  and expensive  machinery"  is not put  in
motion unless it is shown to be warranted. Some simple economic logic suggests,
however, that this justification has things  exactly backwards:  if the aim  is to
conserve resources,  it would seem  preferable  generally to give the burden of
proof to the defendant. A plaintiff has no incentive to bring a claim she knows
lacks  merit,  if she  expects  to  go  to trial.  If most  claims  that  are  filed  are
meritorious,  then  it makes  no  sense to require  the plaintiff to prove  a given
claim's merit; better to require the defendant to prove it lacks merit (which he
will  not waste  time  doing  if it is  in fact meritorious).  This  reasoning  casts
sufficient doubt on conventional wisdom to justify a closer look at the burden
allocation problem with the use of a rigorous model.
Analysis of the model suggests that either of  two considerations might warrant
giving the burden of proof to the plaintiff. These are:  (1) the possibility that the
plaintiff is uncertain of the merit of her claim  when she files  suit; and (2) the
possibility that the parties may settle the claim out of court. Under either of  these
conditions,  the  plaintiff might  rationally  file  a  claim  that  is  not,  in  fact,
meritorious-either  because  she does not know it lacks  merit, or because  she
knows it lacks merit but hopes to extract a settlement from the defendant. For this
reason, there is a potential argument (how strong requires further analysis) for
giving her the burden of proof. The focus of our investigation,  then, will be the
allocation  of the  burden  of proof under  conditions  where  litigants  may  be
uncertain of the merit of a claim or where they may settle out of court.
In the second stage of  the Article, I consider the costs of giving the burden to
one or the other party under either condition. In particular, I attempt to identify
the major properties or "parameters"  of a case that determine the costs of giving
the burden of proof on a particular  issue to the plaintiff or to the defendant.
Analysis of the model indicates that the following parameters  are of principal
importance in determining the optimal burden assignment:  a given party's costs
of presenting evidence to support her position, the probability that this party's
position is correct, that party's costs of presenting evidence, the amount at stake
for the  party,  and the social  cost of an erroneous  decision  against the party.
Analysis of the model also  indicates  that the greater the magnitude  of any  of
these  factors,  then-in  the  presence  of  either  litigant  uncertainty  or  the
possibility of settlement-the greater the costs of giving that party the burden  of
proof.
In  the third  stage,  I use the preceding analysis  to develop  some  tentative
conclusions  about the optimal allocation of the burden of proof. In general,  I
suggest, the  four  factors just alluded  to will be aligned  in such  a way as to
support a default rule in favor of allocating the burden of proof to the plaintiff;
departures from this default rule would be justified if one or more of the factors
4. OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW  77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press of Harvard University 1963) (1881).  Holmes in this passage was speaking of the general
principle that the state  should not intervene  in private affairs unless  a good reason  can be
shown for doing so.
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strongly pointed toward the opposite allocation. Drawing on a brief examination
of familiar judicial practices in assigning the burden, I suggest that the model's
prescriptions  seems  to  correspond  in  broad  outline to  what  is observed  in
practice.
The  Article  is  organized  as  follows.  Part II  introduces  the  framework  of
analysis by describing a simple model of litigation. In Part III, I use the model
informally to show that the traditional justification for giving the plaintiff the
burden  is  incomplete; to make sense  of such an allocation,  we must examine
carefully how the burden of proof operates under conditions where litigants are
uncertain of a claim's merit and where out-of-court settlement is possible. In Part
IV, I examine the allocation problem when litigants  are uncertain of a claim's
merit, and  attempt to identify  the major determinants  of the costs  of a given
allocation.  In  Part  V,  I  examine  the  allocation  problem  when  out-of-court
settlement is possible.  Part VI then  uses this  analysis to  discuss the optimal
burden allocation.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
A.  The Dispute  Resolution Setting
Consider the following very simple three-stage model of a civil dispute. (See
Figure  1.) The plaintiff initially decides whether to file a claim for relief against
the defendant.  (A claim for relief may be thought of as any form of making a
demand of the defendant.)  If she files  a claim, the parties have the chance to
negotiate a settlement of the dispute. If they fail to reach a settlement, the case
is  adjudicated  by the court.  (The court may be thought of as any third-party
decisionmaker.)
Filing of Claim  Settlement  Litigation and
Negotiation  Adjudication
FIGURE 1. - Sequence of events in the model
We  assume  adjudication  has  the  following  form.  There  exists  a  lump  of
evidence that either supports or defeats the plaintiff's claim:  if it supports the
claim, we say the claim is "meritorious"; if the evidence defeats the claim, the
claim  is  "meritless."  This  evidence  is available  to both parties but not to the
court. Either party can present the evidence to the court. If either party presents
the  evidence,  the  court renders judgment  for  the party  whom the  evidence
supports.
For clarity's sake, we make two assumptions throughout. First, the evidence
is unitary in nature, so that the court sees either all of it or none of it. We thus put
to  one  side  the  problems  raised  by partial  or  selective  presentation  of the
19971INDIANA  LA W JOURNAL
evidence.'  We also put to one  side the problem of determining  what level  of
certainty (how much evidence) the court demands before rendering judgment for
one party.'  Second, the cost of presenting the evidence is less than the amount
at stake (the value of the relief sought by the plaintiff).
B. Burden of Proof  as a Cost-Minimizing  Rule
In this setting, the burden of proof is a default rule instructing the court what
to  do if neither party presents  the evidence.  If the plaintiff has the burden  of
proof, she loses if no evidence is presented; if the defendant has the burden, he
loses if  no evidence is presented.7
The basic function of the burden of proof is to allocate among the litigants the
task of gathering and presenting evidence  in the case.8 In an adversary  system in
which the court lacks independent investigatory powers, the court relies on the
parties  to" inform  it  about the facts  of the  case.  The burden  of proof is  the
instrument for allocating the job of fact gathering to one or the other party.
We will assume that the court's objective in allocating the burden of proof is
to minimize two types of costs-more precisely, the sum of the two costs, which
we will call process costs and error costs.9 Process costs consist of the resources
spent by each party  in attempting to secure his preferred result in the case (by
presenting evidence if the case is resolved through litigation; by bargaining for
a favorable settlement if the case is resolved through negotiation).'0
Error costs consist of the disadvantageous  results  produced by  an outcome
favoring one party when the evidence supports the other."  For example, putting
the burden on the plaintiff may mean, in some instances, that the plaintiff will
lose in court (because she fails to present evidence),  or settle the case for less
than her damages, even though the evidence indicates she is "in  the right." The
effect  of  such  errors  may  be  to  frustrate  such  objectives  as  deterrence,
compensation,  or whatever other functions the substantive  law may have.
5. The interpretation here might be that if one party presents the evidence selectively, the
other party corrects the imbalance.
6. For example,  should the court demand 50% certainty, 90% certainty, or whatever.
7. Throughout,  we use the female pronoun to refer to the plaintiff, the male pronoun to
refer to the defendant.
8. This function is explored in Hay & Spier, supra  note 3.
9. Here we draw on Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure  and
Judicial  Administration,  2 J. LEGAL STuD. 399 (1973).
10. Process costs also consist of the resources devoted by the court to adjudicating the case.
We leave these out for purposes of exposition; the analysis is easily.adapted  to include them.
11.  Below we define more precisely this notion of an erroneous outcome.
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C. Effects of  the Burden Allocation
To determine the optimal allocation of the burden of proof, the court must sort
out the rule's effect on the parties'  decisions  in the three stages of  the model. Let
us consider them in reverse order.
At the litigation stage,  the parties  decide  what  to  invest in  gathering  and
presenting evidence. By determining who is responsible for presenting evidence,
the burden of proof allocation will affect both the expected costs of litigation and
the likelihood of an erroneous  outcome in the case.
At the negotiation  stage, the parties bargain over settlement terms. By affecting
the parties'  expected costs of litigation, the burden of proof rule affects the size
of the "pot"-the potential gains from trade-that the parties will bargain over.
It thus affects the negotiating costs the parties are willing to incur. In addition,
by affecting the settlement amount, it affects the likelihood that a party may settle
for too little or too' much.
At thefiling stage, the plaintiff decides whether to file a claim; recall that we
construe this broadly to encompass any  form of making a demand against the
defendant. The costs of the succeeding stages-litigation and negotiation-are
only incurred if  the plaintiff decides to file suit. Her decision will be influenced
by what she expects to get in the succeeding stages; these will be a function of
the burden allocation. By influencing the plaintiff's decision to file, the burden
allocation further affects the process costs generated by successive stages, and
also affects once again the likelihood of an erroneous outcome.
The court's problem, therefore, is to predict the parties'  equilibrium  decisions
under a given allocation,  and to assess the costs generated by those decisions.  In
what follows we analyze this problem.
III. WHY EVER GIVE THE BURDEN TO THE PLAINTIFF?
We begin by considering a puzzle. By far the most common practice is to give
the plaintiff the burden of proof on a contested issue in litigation. Yet intuition
suggests the practice has it exactly wrong: analysis of party incentives suggests
that in general the defendant should generally  bear the burden of proof. The
question we take up in this part, then, is why courts would ever want to give the
plaintiff the burden of proof.
A. Holes in the Conventional  Wisdom
Probably the most common rationale given for allocating  the burden of proof
to  the  plaintiff is  that  it  conserves  legal  resources  by  preventing  needless
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disruptions  of the  status  quo.' 2  Though  seldom  worked  out  in  detail, 3  the
argument  appears to take the following form:  All else being equal,  it is more
costly than not for the court to intervene in a dispute (because intervening eats
up resources that could be put to some other-use)."  The plaintiff, being the one
pressing for judicial intervention, should therefore be required to show that she
is  entitled  to  the relief she  seeks.  Such  a  rule  ensures that the legal  system
will-in general-only  intervene in cases where there is a good reason  (where
relief is warranted).
This line of argument  overlooks the fact that it takes two  parties to start a
lawsuit. The defendant could have averted a lawsuit by giving the plaintiff what
she demanded. 5 For example, if the plaintiff is suing on a contract, or suing for
damages  following  an  accident,  the  defendant  could  have  simply  paid  the
plaintiff the money  she  claimed  she  was owed.  Whatever relief the plaintiff
seeks,  the  defendant  could  have  given  it  to  her  directly,  without  court
intervention.  In this sense, the defendant is as responsible  as the plaintiff for
instigating the litigation.
Indeed,  it  is  tempting  to  state  a  procedural  corollary  to  Coase's  famous
proposition about tort law: lawsuits, like accidents,  are reciprocal events.  The
victim, no less than the injurer, is the "cause" of the accident; the victim could
have  taken  avoidance  measures  to  prevent  the  accident. 6  Likewise,  the
defendant,  no less than the plaintiff, is the "cause"  of the litigation; he could
have taken steps to prevent the lawsuit, with all of its ensuing costs.' 7
This being so, the conventional argument for giving the plaintiff the burden
can be turned on itself. The contrary argument would be: the defendant, having
forced the plaintiff to sue, should be required to show he had a good reason for
doing so-that is, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought. This will
ensure that plaintiffs with sound claims will not needlessly be forced to sue; the
result will be to conserve judicial resources.
This contrary line of argument may or may not seem plausible. It is, however,
not obviously less plausible than the earlier argument for giving the plaintiff the
burden.  It will not do,  therefore,  to argue that the burden of proof should be
12.  See,  e.g.,  Edward  W.  Cleary,  Presuming and Pleading: An  Essay on Juristic
Immaturity, 12 STAN.  L. REV. 1, 5 (1959).
13.  It is invoked,  without discussion,  in practically every  textbook on the subject. For
examples, consult virtually any casebook or treatise on the law of  evidence. A classic example
is 2 McCoRMICK  ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 428 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (Practitioner
Treatise Series).
14. Cf HOLMES, supra  note 4, at 77 ("[The prevailing view is that [the law's]  cumbrous
and  expensive machinery  ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit  is to be
derived from disturbing the status quo.") (emphasis in original).
15. I  put to one side the rare cases in which the plaintiff sues out of the blue, without first
having made a demand of the defendant.
16. The farmer whose crops are destroyed by the railroad  could put up protective fencing;
could pay the railroad to take protective measures; could move her farm to a different location;
or she could go into a different line of business.
17. This idea of reciprocal responsibility presumably underlies the so-called British rule on
fee awards. The idea is that the losing party, having forced the other into court, should be held
responsible for the resulting legal expenses.
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placed on the plaintiff because she is the one responsible for putting the legal
machinery  into motion. That criterion gives  as much support for the opposite
allocation.
B. The Prima Facie Case  for Giving the Burden to the
Defendant
In fact, there is an additional, much stronger argument that the burden should
normally be assigned to the defendant. It can be summarized as follows: if  the
plaintiff expects her case to be heard in court, she has no incentive to bring a
claim she knows to be meritless; she would just be wasting her time, because she
would not recover anything."  Accordingly (the argument goes), there is no point
in forcing the plaintiff to prove her case is meritorious,  because she would not
have brought it if it were otherwise.
To flesh out this argument, let us make two simplifying assumptions. Assume,
first, that all disputes go to court; they are never resolved through negotiation.
Assume, second, that both parties know whether the claim is meritorious (that is,
whether  the  evidence  supports  the  claim).  We  want  to  compare  the  costs
generated by giving the burden allocation to one or the other party. To do this,
let  us  derive  the  parties'  equilibrium  strategies  under  alternative  burden
allocations.
Consider what the parties will do if  the plaintiff files suit. Figure 2 indicates
the actions the parties will take in equilibrium. Observe that if a party is "in the
right" (if  the evidence supports his side), that party will present evidence if and
only  if he has the  burden  of proof. 19  If that party  is  not "in  the right"  (the
evidence is against him), he will not present evidence, no matter who bears the
burden of proof. 20
18. The plaintiff would be wasting money as well as time. No lawyer would represent her
on  a contingent fee basis, so she would have to pay her lawyer a non-contingent fee. This
would leave her out of pocket at the end of the litigation.
19. If he has the burden of proof, he will introduce the evidence because otherwise he will
lose (recall that the costs of  presenting evidence are less than the value of the relief sought). If
he does not have the burden of proof, he will not bother presenting the evidence, because he
will win the case whether or not the other side presents the evidence.
20. There is no point in incurring the cost of presenting the evidence, since doing so will
only lead the court to rule against him.
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Burden  on
Plaintiff
Burden on
Defendant
Meritorious claim  Meritless claim
Plaintiff presents  Neither party
evidence
(Defendant does not)  presents  evidence
Neither party  Defendant presents
presents evidence  evidence
(Plaintiff does not)
FIGURE 2. - Equilibrium litigation strategies under alternative burden of proof
allocations, when the parties know whether the claim is meritorious
Now consider the plaintiffs  decision  to file suit. From the foregoing  it is
evident that the plaintiff will not file a meritless claim. This is true no matter who
bears the burden of proof: under either allocation, she would lose the case, and
thus have no reason to waste her time and money taking it to court. Accordingly,
the  plaintiff will  file suit  only if her  claim  is meritorious,  regardless  of the
burden allocation.
We  are  now  in  a position  to  compare  the costs  of the alternative  burden
allocations. Begin with process costs. For reasons just seen, all cases that go to
court will be meritorious. If the plaintiff has the burden, then (as we know from
Figure 2) the plaintiff will present evidence  in all cases. If the defendant has the
burden, then (again,  from Figure 2) neither party will present evidence. Thus, the
costs of presenting evidence will be incurred if the plaintiff is given the burden
of proving it to the court. Accordingly, the plaintiff will file suit only if her claim
is meritorious, regardless of the burden allocation.
Turn now to error costs. As is evident from Figure 2, the burden allocation has
no effect on the outcome of the case. If the claim is meritorious (supported by the
evidence),  the  plaintiff  wins  under  either  allocation;  if the  claim  is  not
meritorious, the defendant wins under either allocation. Thus, no errors (as we
have defined them) are produced by either burden allocation.
Giving the defendant the burden, then, generates (in equilibrium) zero process
costs and zero error costs. In contrast,  giving the plaintiff the burden generates
positive process  costs and zero error costs. The sum of error costs and process
costs, then, is higher if the plaintiff is assigned the burden of proof. If we grant,
therefore, the two assumptions made earlier-that all cases go to court, and that
the parties know whether the claim is meritorious-it is clearly preferable to give
the defendant the burden of proof.
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C. Countervailing  Factors
To justify ever giving the plaintiff the burden of proof, then, we must relax one
or both of these assumptions. Let us see how the analysis is affected if we relax
either assumption.
1. Uncertainty
Drop the assumption that the parties know (at all stages of  the dispute) whether
the claim is meritorious. Let us assume, instead, that the plaintiff is uncertain
how the court would rule if  it were presented with the evidence."  Then giving the
defendant the burden will entail some costs that do not arise when both parties
are fully informed.
The reason, quite simply, is that the plaintiff may rationally file a claim that
is-though not-to her knowledge-meritless.  Suppose she does so; and suppose
the  defendant  has  the  burden  of proof. If the  defendant  knows  (or  has  a
sufficiently strong belief) that the claim is meritless, he will present evidence to
the court. If the defendant does not know (or lacks a sufficiently strong belief)
that the claim is meritless, he will refrain from presenting  evidence-and will
(erroneously)  lose the case.
In either event, allocating to the defendant the burden generates costs that are
not present  when the parties  are  both  fully  informed. If the  defendant  does
present the evidence,  the result will be some process  costs.2  If the defendant
does not present the evidence, the result will be some error costs.'  Thus, the sum
of error and process costs will be positive.
2. Settlement
Now drop the assumption  that all  cases  are resolved through adjudication.
Suppose, instead, that it is possible for the parties to negotiate a settlement of the
dispute. Here too, giving the defendant the burden of proof introduces some costs
that do not arise when settlement is impossible.
The reason  is that the plaintiff may rationally choose to pursue a  claim she
knows (or believes) to be meritless. If the defendant has the burden of proof, he
will be willing to pay a positive amount to settle the case,  in order to spare
himself the cost of defending himself in court. The plaintiff, knowing this, may
file a claim solely for the sake of extracting such a settlement from the defendant.
In  essence, giving the defendant the burden invites a form of rent-seeking  by
plaintiffs with meritless claims.
21. This might be either because the plaintiff has not seen the evidence yet, or because she
has seen it but does not know how the court will react to it. It makes no difference for present
purposes.
22. Recall that if the parties are fully informed, giving the defendant the burden generates
no process costs (in the form of presenting evidence to the court).
23. Recall that when both parties are fully informed, there are never any erroneous rulings
by the court.
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The  effect  is  to  produce  process  costs,  as the parties  devote  resources  in
bargaining over how this "rent"-the defendant's saved litigation costs-should
be divided in settlement.  In addition,  error costs may result if the defendant is
forced to pay a positive amount on a meritless claim. Thus, the sum of process
and error costs is likely to be positive if the defendant bears the burden.
D. The Analysis to Follow
Introducing either uncertainty or the possibility of settlement, then, undermines
our earlier axiomatic demonstration that the defendant should get the burden  of
proof. That demonstration depended  on showing that, in equilibrium, giving the
defendant the burden would yield no process costs or error costs. But as we have
seen,  given litigant uncertainty  or the possibility of settlement, the sum of these
costs is likely to be positive.
To be sure, it does not follow that under such conditions the plaintiff should
get  the burden  of proof. The sum  of process  and error costs  is  likely to  be
positive under that allocation as well. Determining whether (and when) the sum
of process and error costs  is  lower under one or the other allocation  requires
further analysis. Our analysis to this point shows only that litigant uncertainty
and the possibility of settlement furnish potential rationales for allocating the
burden to the plaintiff.
In what follows we attempt to identify the circumstances under which one or
the other allocation  is  optimal. To  do this, we will examine,  separately,  how
litigant uncertainty and the possibility of settlement affect the costs of a given
allocation.  We  then  use  the  results  of this  investigation  to  issue  some
generalizations  about which allocation is likely to create lower total costs.
IV.  LITIGANT UNCERTAINTY
To  examine  how litigant uncertainty  affects  the costs  of a given burden  of
proof allocation, we will assume for clarity's sake that all disputes  (in which
claims are filed) are adjudicated by the court.
A.  The Litigants' Decisions Under Uncertainty
Let us begin by deriving the parties'  behavior in  equilibrium when they are
uncertain  about the merit of the plaintiff's claim. As our starting point, observe
that if a  party  does  not bear the burden  of proof, then  he will not invest in
presenting  evidence to the court. He has no reason to since the court is already
predisposed in his favor, he gains nothing from presenting the evidence.24 With
24. Another way of saying this is that it is a dominant strategy for him not to present the
evidence. If his opponent presents the evidence, then there is no point in the party's duplicating
the effort; and if his opponent does not present the evidence, then the party will win by doing
nothing. No matter what his opponent does, then, the party  is better off not presenting the
evidence.
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this in mind, let us analyze the litigation decisions of the party that bears the
burden of proof, given that he is uncertain of the merit of the plaintiff's claim.
Assume a given party bears the burden  of proof. If suit has been filed, that
party will present the evidence if and only if the following expression holds:
party's estimated  amount at  party's cost
chance of success  x  stake  >  of presenting  (1) evidence.
The first term represents the party's subjective estimate of  the probability that the
court will rule in his favor if it sees the evidence; the second term represents the
amount at stake for the party (the value of winning a favorable judgment); 2 5 the
third term represents the costs the party will incur in gathering and presenting the
evidence.
We will call Expression  1  the party's "threshold" for presenting evidence. The
threshold is satisfied if and only if the inequality holds. The intuition here is that
if the inequality  does not hold, the party's perceived odds of winning are too
small to justify the costs of presenting evidence; he is better off simply losing the
case without presenting  evidence.
Now consider the plaintiffs decision whether to file a claim. We will assume
that there is only a very slight cost to filing a claim, so that the plaintiff will sue
provided that there is some positive expected return from doing so. Granted this
assumption, then the plaintiff will file a claim if the defendant bears the burden
of proof, so long as the plaintiff's estimated  chance of winning is greater than
zero.26 If, instead, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, then she will file a
claim if and only if the plaintiff's threshold for presenting evidence is satisfied.
For if that threshold is not satisfied, the plaintiff knows she will lose the case
(because she will not present evidence),  so there is no point in suing.
B. Costs ofAlternative Allocations
Using this analysis of the parties'  behavior, let us examine the costs generated
by one or the other burden allocation. We begin by deriving expressions for the
costs in equilibrium; we then examine how these costs are affected by changes
in different features of the case.
25. Usually this will be the same for both parties, but not always. For example, one party
but not the other may have reputational gains or losses at stake.
26.  We implicitly assume that the party without the burden of proof bears no litigation
costs.
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1. The Costs of a Given  Allocation
(a) Process  Costs. - For a particular dispute, the expected process costs of a
given burden allocation are simply the expected costs of presenting evidence. As
we  have  seen  from  the  analysis  of the parties'  behavior,  evidence  will  be
presented by the party with the burden, if and only if that party's threshold for
presenting evidence is satisfied.
Accordingly, the process  costs generated by allocating the burden of proof to
a given party are:
probability the party's threshold  party's cost of
for presenting evidence is satisfied  x  presenting evidence.  (2)
The interpretation of this expression is as follows. Consider a set of cases (say,
auto accident cases) in which the burden of proof is on one party. Within that set
of cases, that party's subjective estimate of his chances of success may vary; so
may the costs of presenting  evidence  and the value of relief. The first term in
Expression 2 refers to the likelihood that, for a given case within the set, these
variables combine to satisfy the relevant threshold for presenting evidence.
(b) Error  Costs. - Expected  error costs of a given allocation  are the cost of
an erroneous outcome,  weighted by the probability that an erroneous outcome
will occur. An erroneous outcome, as we have defined it, occurs when the party
whom the evidence  supports nonetheless  loses;  this can happen  because  that
party may rationally choose not to present evidence when he bears the burden of
proof.
In effect, putting the burden of proof on one party amounts to "presuming"  that
the  evidence  is  against the party;  an error  occurs  when  the evidence  in  fact
supports  the party,  but he  chooses  not to  present the evidence  (and thereby
defaults).  Accordingly, the expected error costs  of allocating  the burden  to  a
given party are:
probability  probability the  cost of
the claim of  party's threshold  erroneous
the party is  x  for evidence is not  x  default by  (3)
correct  satisfied  the party.
The first term is the probability that the claim is meritless (if the party with the
burden  is  the defendant)  or  meritorious  (if the party  with  the burden  is the
plaintiff). The second term is the probability that the party with the burden will
nonetheless  decline  to  present  evidence.  Combined,  these  first  two  terms
represent the probability of an  erroneous  outcome. The third term represents
whatever  disadvantage comes from erroneously holding the defendant liable (if
[Vol.  72:651BURDEN  OF  PROOF
the defendant bears the burden of proof) or from erroneously absolving him of
liability (if the plaintiff has the burden).
2. Comparative Statics
As the above expressions indicate, the costs of allocating the burden to a given
party are a function of five parameters: the probability the party is correct; the
party's estimate of that probability; the party's costs of presenting evidence; the
amount at stake for the party; and the social costs of an erroneous ruling against
the party.
We now consider how the costs of the allocation vary with changes  in these
parameters.  To do this, we will investigate what happens to Expressions 2 and
3  when  we  vary  one  parameter  while  holding the  others  constant.  Table  1
summarizes our results.'  Let us briefly explain the intuition behind these results.
TABLE 1
EFFECT OF AN INCREASE IN ONE PARAMETER
ON THE COSTS OF ALLOCATING THE BURDEN TO A GIVEN PARTY
Increased parameter  Process costs  Error costs
Probability the party is  none  +
correct
Party's optimism  +
Party's cost of  inconclusive  +
presenting evidence
Amount at stake for  +  inconclusive
party
Social cost of error  none  +
against party
(a)  Probable merits.  - Consider  what  happens  when  we  increase  the
probability  that the party bearing  the burden  of proof is  "correct, 28  without
changing  any other parameter. A  change in this probability-as  distinguished
from his estimate of the probability29 -has  no effect on the party's decision to
27. A "+" sign means the costs of  the allocation go up; a"-" sign means the costs go down;
the term "inconclusive"  means the costs may go up or down.
28. The plaintiff is correct if the claim is meritorious; the defendant is correct if  the claim
is meritless.
29. We assume here that his estimate is held fixed. In practice, his estimate will generally
be correlated with the true probability, but this makes no difference for present purposes. (We
consider below the significance of that likely correlation.)
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present  evidence;  accordingly  it has  no  effect  on  expected  litigation  costs.
However,  it increases  the  chances  that a  ruling  against the party  (when  no
evidence is presented) will yield an erroneous  outcome. Accordingly, an increase
in the probability that the party  is  correct has no  effect on process costs, but
raises  the error  costs of  giving that  party the burden ofproof
(b) Party  beliefs. - Now consider what happens when we increase the party's
estimate of his chances of winning if evidence is presented. This makes it more
likely that he will present the evidence. As a result, it makes it more likely that
litigation costs will be incurred; at the same time, it makes it less likely that an
error will occur (because it is more likely that the court will see the evidence).
Thus, an increase in a party's estimate  of his chances raises  the process costs,
but lowers the error  costs, of  giving him the burden ofproof
(c) Costs ofpresenting evidence. - Now consider the effect of increasing the
party's litigation  costs. This makes it less likely he will present the evidence. As
a result the likelihood of error goes up because the court is less likely to see the
evidence.  Regarding  process  costs, the  effect  is ambiguous:  evidence  is  less
likely to be presented, but if it is presented, relatively high presentation costs will
be incurred.  Accordingly, an  increase  in a party's cost of presenting  evidence
raises  the error  costs and  may raise  or lower the  process costs of  giving him the
burden ofproof
(d) Amount at stake. - Next, consider the effect of increasing the amount at
stake for the party. This makes it more likely that he will present the evidence;
thus, expected litigation costs go up, and the likelihood of an error goes down.
However,  all else equal, the more a party has to lose, the greater the cost of an
erroneous ruling against him."  The model gives us no way of determining the net
effect on expected error costs. Accordingly,  an increase in the amount at stake
for a party raises the process costs, and  may raise  or lower the error  costs, of
giving him the burden ofproof
(e) Social cost of  erroneous outcome. - Suppose, finally, that we increase the
social cost of an erroneous ruling against the party, without changing any other
parameter. This will have no effect on the party's decision to present evidence."
As a result, it will have no effect on expected litigation costs or on the likelihood
of an error; its only effect is to increase the loss sustained by society in the event
an error occurs. Thus,  an increase  in the cost of an erroneous ruling against a
party has no effect on the process costs, but raises  the error  costs, of giving that
party the burden ofproof
30. Thus, the cost of an erroneous outcome is in part a function of the amount at stake for
the party. For example, if the plaintiff has  100 at stake but the defendant has 200 at stake
(perhaps because he will suffer reputational  losses if held liable), then a ruling against the
defendant generates a social cost, in the sense that he loses more than the plaintiff gains. (That
loss  may  be  offset  by  other  social  gains,  for  example  deterrence  if the  defendant  acted
wrongfully.)
31.  As Expression  I indicates, the party cares about the amount at stake, not the social cost
of error as such. Since we are holding the amount at stake constant, a change  in the social cost
of error has no effect on his behavior.
(Vol. 72:651BURDEN OF  PROOF
C. Factors  Bearing  on the Costs of an Allocation
We are now in a position to assess the influence of different case parameters
on the total costs of a given allocation  in the model.  Table  2 combines  and
summarizes the comparative-static  results from the previous  section.32 As the
table  indicates,  an  increase  in  one  of the  parameters-holding  the  others
constant-generally raises the cost of a given allocation. This is true for'all of the
parameters except the party's estimated chances of success; here the effect of an
increase  is ambiguous, because the increase  causes process costs to go up and
error costs to go down.
TABLE 2
EFFECT OF AN INCREASE IN ONE PARAMETER ON THE
TOTAL COSTS OF ALLOCATING THE BURDEN TO A GIVEN PARTY
Increased parameter  Effect on total costs
Probability the party is correct  +
Party's optimism  inconclusive
Party's cost of presenting  evidence  +
Amount at stake for party  +
Social cost of error against party  +
V. SETTLEMENT
We turn now to the costs of a given allocation when the parties may settle their
dispute  out  of court.  To  examine  this  setting,  we will  restore  our  original
assumption  that  the  parties  know  whether  the  claim  is  meritorious.  This
assumption  is made for purposes of expositional clarity;  it is not essential to our
conclusions."
32. Table 2 was constructed by combining each parameter's effects on process costs and
error costs. For example, raising the probability that the claim is meritorious has the effect of
increasing the process cost of giving the plaintiff the burden of proof, while its effect on error
costs is  inconclusive. Its net effect,  therefore,  is in general  to raise the costs of giving the
burden of proof to the plaintiff. It follows that, all else equal, the higher the probability the
claim is meritorious, the more total social costs are generated by giving the plaintiff the burden
of proof. A similar procedure was used to yield the conclusions in Table 2 regarding the other
parameters.
33.  I make the assumption in order to avoid the complexities of modeling the process of
bargaining  under  asymmetric  information.  See,  e.g.,  Lucian  A.  Bebchuk, Litigation and
Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984).
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Because the settlement process reflects to some extent the parties'  expectations
of what will happen  in litigation, our analysis in this part will build on our earlier
derivation of the parties'  equilibrium behavior in litigation. The central claim we
will explore is simple: by determining the magnitude and distribution of costs
faced by the parties in litigation, the burden of proof determines how and to what
extent litigation costs influence the process and outcome of settlement bargaining
between the parties. As a result, the burden allocation affects both the resources
invested in settlement bargaining and the extent to which settlement outcomes
diverge from the "merits" of the case.
A.  The Parties'  Settlement Decisions
We begin by analyzing how the burden of proof allocation affects the parties'
settlement behavior. Its central effect is to establish the payoffs from going to
court, which in turn establish the range of feasible settlement  amounts. As we
know from the literature  on the settlement  of litigation,  the plaintiff will not
settle for any amount less than the expected award in court minus her anticipated
litigation  costs;  the  defendant  will  not settle for  any  amount  more than  the
expected award in court plus his anticipated  litigation costs.
The  burden  of  proof  rule  affects  the  parties'  bargaining  positions  by
determining their anticipated litigation costs. 4 As a result, it has two important
consequences:  (1)  it  determines  the extent to  which  the parties'  bargaining
positions diverge from one another;  and (2) it determines the value of the range
of feasible settlement amounts which diverges from the expected award in court.
The  point  can  best  be  seen  with  a  numerical  example.  Suppose  that- the
expected award in court is 100 if the claim is meritorious and zero otherwise; and
suppose each party's  cost of presenting  evidence is 25.  Figure 3 indicates the
parties'  payoffs  from  litigation under  different  burden of proof allocations,
depending on whether the claim is meritorious. These payoffs are obtained by
deriving the parties'  equilibrium litigation strategies, which we did in our earlier
analysis.
35
To see the significance of these payoffs, focus on the case in which the claim
is  meritorious.  Suppose  the  defendant  has  the  burden.  Then,  as  Figure  3
indicates, the parties'  payoffs are the same (that is, the defendant's expected loss
from  litigation  equals  the  plaintiff's  expected  gain  from  litigation).  This  is
because neither party will present the evidence in litigation. As a result, there is
only one feasible settlement amount (100). In addition, observe that this amount
is the expected award in court.
34. As we saw in our earlier discussion, the burden of proof does not-when the parties are
fully informed of the claim's merit-affect the outcome of the case in court; the plaintiff will
win in court if and only if her claim is meritorious. See supra part III.B. (Recall our assumption
that the amoint at stake exceeds a party's costs of  gathering and presenting evidence.)
35. See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
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Burden on
Plaintiff
Burden  on
Defendant
Meritorious claim  Meritless claim
Plaintiff: 75  Plaintiff:  0
Defendant:  (100)  Defendant:  0
Plaintiff: 0  Plaintiff: 0
Defendant: 0  Defendant: (25)
FIGuRE 3. - Equilibrium litigation strategies under alternative burden of proof
allocations, when the parties know whether the claim is meritorious
Now  suppose,  instead, that the plaintiff has the burden.  Then the parties'
payoffs are no  longer the same: the plaintiff's expected  gain from litigation is
less than the defendant's expected loss, because the plaintiff must incur the costs
of presenting  evidence.  As  a  result,  there  is  a  range  of feasible  settlement
amounts (any settlement amount between 75 and  100 makes both parties better
off than  going  to  litigation).  In addition,  most of these  feasible  settlement
amounts are less than the expected award in court.
Giving the plaintiff the burden of proof, then, has two effects (as compared to
the  opposite  allocation)  when  the  claim  is  meritorious.  First,  it widens the
bargaining range (the range of feasible settlements)  by creating a surplus from
settlement. Since the parties jointly stand to lose 25 if they go to court, 36 they in
effect save 25 by settling.  To settle the case, the parties must agree on some
division  of this  surplus.  Each  of them  will  seek,  in  bargaining  toward  a
settlement, to capture as much as he can. (Thus, the defendant will try to settle
for an amount near 75; the plaintiff will try to settle for an amount near  100.)
Notice that this surplus does not exist if the defendant has the burden of proof,
so there is nothing to bargain over; the parties will simply settle for  100.
Second, it in effect distorts the outcome of the case by creating a divergence
between the expected settlement amount and the expected award in court. Unless
the  plaintiff always  captures  the full surplus  from settling-and  there  is no
reason to suppose she does-then the case will settle for less than  100, so that
the  plaintiff gets  less  than the  expected  award  the court  would give  her.  In
contrast, if the burden were on the defendant, the case would settle for 100.
The reason these effects occur is that, when the claim is meritorious, giving the
plaintiff  the burden generates  litigation  costs that would not be generated  by the
opposite allocation.  If the defendant had the burden of proof, expected litigation
costs  would  be  zero;  there  would,  accordingly,  be  no  surplus  to  divide  in
settlement, and there would be no litigation costs to distort the outcome of the
case.
36. It is unimportant for this purpose that the plaintiff bears all 25.
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. A similar analysis obtains for the case in which the claim is meritless. If the
plaintiff has the burden, the defendant will pay nothing to settle the case, because
he faces no litigation costs and no expected liability; accordingly, the plaintiff
will not bother filing the claim. If the defendant has the burden, he will pay up
to 25  to settle the case.  The plaintiff will rationally  file suit in the hopes  of
extracting  a  settlement. 7  This  creates  a  surplus  of 25  (the  costs  saved  by
settling), which the parties will bargain over;  and any payment exceeding zero
is more than the defendant would be made to pay by the court.
Now, it should be clear that this analysis holds in substance even if  we drop the
unrealistic  assumptions that only  the party with the burden of proof presents
evidence, and that presenting evidence is the only cost of litigation. It is enough,
for  our purposes,  to assume  that,  all  else equal,  a  party  will spend more  on
presenting evidence if(1) he has the burden of proof, and (2) the evidence tends
(or  can be presented in  such a way as) to support him. If so,  then putting the
burden on the party whom the evidence supports will widen the bargaining range,
and increase the divergence  between the expected  settlement  amount and the
expected award in court."
B. Costs ofAlternative Allocations
Using this analysis of  the burden allocation's effects on settlement bargaining,
let us attempt to characterize the costs of alternative allocations. As before, we
begin by deriving expressions for the equilibrium value of these costs, and then
examine how the costs are affected by changes in case parameters.
1. Costs of a Given Allocation
(a) Process Costs. - When parties  can settle their dispute, the process costs
of a given allocation consist of the resources expended on bargaining. As we saw
above, if there is a surplus to be reaped from settling, each party will attempt to
capture as large a distributive share of the surplus as possible. We will not model
37.  The  possibility  of extracting  a settlement  by  imposing  (threatened)  costs  on  the
defendant in this manner is examined  in D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits
Are Brought  for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
38. To see the point, suppose in our earlier example that (1) when the evidence supports
a party, he spends  15 in presenting evidence if he does not have the burden of proof, and 25
if he has the burden of proof; (2) when the evidence does not support the party, he spends 5 in
presenting evidence if he does not have the burden and  10 if he does have the burden; and (3)
that each party incurs some other litigation cost C (not related to presenting evidence).
Assume the claim is meritorious. If the plaintiff has the burden, then the plaintiff's payoff
from litigation  is 100-25-C = 75-C; the defendant's expected payoff is 100+5+C = 105+C. The
width of the settlement range is 30+2C; the midpoint of the settlement range (halfway between
the parties'  payoffs) is 90.
If the defendant has the burden, the plaintiff's payoff from litigation is 100-15-C=85-C;  the
defendant's payoff is 100+10+C=1 1+C. The width of the settlement range  is 25+2C;  the
midpoint of the settlement range is 97.5. Thus, both the width of the settlement range and its
divergence from the expected award are smaller when the defendant has the burden.
A similar analysis obtains for the case in which the claim is meritless.
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the bargaining process explicitly; for present purposes it is enough to say that the
negotiations  may potentially  involve  a costly  and protracted  series of offers,
counteroffers, threats, bluffs, and the like.
As is clear from Figure 3, the burden of proof generates a positive settlement
surplus if the party whom the evidence supports is compelled to demonstrate this
to the court. Accordingly, the expected process costs generated by allocating the
burden to a given party are:
probability the party's  costs of negotiating a
threshold for presenting  x  division of the gains  (4)
evidence is satisfied  from settlement.
The  left-hand  term  represents  the  probability  that  the party  would  present
evidence if  the case were to go to court. The gains from settling then consist of
the  litigation costs that are  avoided by  settling; these are the party's costs  of
presenting  evidence.  The  right-hand  term  represents  the  costs  of reaching
agreement on how this surplus will be distributed between the parties.
(b) Error Costs. - Error costs arise from  the distorting effect of imposing
litigation costs on the party who is "in the right."  The prospect of incurring those
costs will compel her to make concessions to her opponent in settlement. In our
earlier numerical example, if the plaintiffs claim is meritorious, the expected
award is 100; but if she has the burden she is forced to settle for some amount
between 75  and 100.
3  Similarly, if the plaintiff's claim is meritless, the expected
award is zero; but if the defendant has the burden, the defendant is forced to
settle for some amount between zero and twenty-five.40
We  will assume that,  in expected terms, the parties split  the surplus  from
settlement down the middle; that is, in expected terms, they settle for an amount
at the midpoint  of the settlement  range.4  This  assumption is  plausible if, in
general, neither party has greater bargaining power than the other42 Thus, in our
numerical example, the meritorious  claim recovers too little (in the amount of
12.5) if the plaintiff bears the burden of proof; the meritless  claim recovers too
much (again,  12.5) if  the defendant has the burden of proof. We will term these
errors "settlement concessions" by the party with the burden of proof.
39. In contrast, if the defendant has the burden, he faces no litigation costs (because he will
not present evidence); thus the case will settle for 100.
40. In contrast, if  the plaintiff has the burden, she will not bring suit and the defendant will
pay nothing.
41.  This is the  usual equilibrium outcome when the parties have symmetric stakes and
information.
42. There are two possible interpretations here. One is that they alternate making demands,
and each has a 50% chance of making the true "final offer." The other is that, anticipating this
possibility, they simply agree to split the difference. It does not matter which interpretation we
adopt here.
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Expected error costs in this scenario depend on how "bad"  it is for claims to
collect too much or too little, and on the likelihood of such an occurrence. Thus
the error cost of a given burden allocation  is:
probability the party is
correct
expected cost of
erroneous outcome.
The  second term  reflects the costs of an  erroneous  settlement  concession  or
default by the party with  the  burden  of proof, weighted  by  their  respective
probabilities. Thus, the second term is given by the following:
probability the
I  party's
threshold for
presenting
evidence is
satisfied
cost of
erroneous[
settlement  +  th
concession  Pr
by party  e
robability the
arty's
reshold for
resenting
iidence is
ot satisfied
The interpretation here is that if the party's threshold for evidence is satisfied,
the  litigants  will  bargain  over  the settlement  surplus,  and the party with  the
burden  will  be  forced  to  make  concessions.  If the  party's  threshold  is  not
satisfied, he will be forced to default.
4 3
2. Comparative  Statics
Let  us  see  how  the process  costs  of a  given  allocation  change  with  the
parameters  discussed  earlier."  Table  3  summarizes our results;  let us briefly
discuss  each.
43. If  the party with the burden is the plaintiff, then the defendant will not pay anything in
settlement (because the plaintiff has no credible threat of presenting evidence at trial), so the
plaintiff will drop the case. If the party with the burden is the defendant, then the plaintiff will
not accept anything less than the amount at stake (because the defendant has no credible threat
to present the evidence), so the defendant will pay the full amount at stake.
44. Because the parties are assumed to know the merit of  the claim, we omit the "estimated
chance of success"  parameter.
cost of
erroneous
x  default
by party.
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TABLE 3
EFFECT OF AN INCREASE  IN ONE PARAMETER
ON THE COSTS OF ALLOCATING  THE BURDEN TO A GIVEN PARTY
Increased parameter  Process costs  Error costs
Probability the party is  +  +
correct
Party's cost of  inconclusive  +
presenting evidence
Amount at stake for  +  inconclusive
party
Social cost of error  none  +
against party
(a)  Probable merits.  - Consider  what  happens  when  we  increase  the
probability that the party bearing the burden of proof is correct. It then becomes
more likely that his  threshold for presenting  evidence  will be  satisfied. As  a
result, it becomes more  likely  that the allocation will generate  a surplus  (the
party's avoided litigation costs) for the parties to bargain over. It thus becomes
more likely that the parties will engage in settlement bargaining. Accordingly, an
increase in the probability that a party is correct has the effect of raising  the cost
of  giving that  party the burden ofproof.
The effect  on error costs is  less  obvious.  On the one  hand, increasing  the
probability  that  the  party  is  correct  increases  the  likelihood  that  imposing
litigation costs on that party will distort the outcome of the case. On the other
hand, the second term in Expression 5 may go up or down; there is no obvious
reason to expect a move in either direction to be more likely. 45 Combining the
effects,  it  appears  that  increasing  the  probability  that  the  party  is  correct
generally has the effect of increasing  the error  costs of allocating  the burden to
that  party.
(b) Costs ofpresenting evidence. - Now consider the effect of increasing the
litigation costs of the party who bears the burden of proof. Regarding process
costs, the net effect here is ambiguous: on the one hand,  it makes it less likely
that the party's threshold for presenting evidence is satisfied; it thus makes it less
likely that there will be  a surplus to bargain  over.  On the other hand,  if the
party's threshold is satisfied, an increase  in his costs means an increase  in the
size of the surplus that the parties will bargain over. It is reasonable to conjecture
that  in general,  the larger this  surplus  is, the more the parties will  invest in
45. The first term in Expression 6 goes up; the third term in Expression 6 goes down. There
is no  reason  to  know whether Expression  6 as a whole-and  hence  the second  term in
Expression 5-goes up or down.
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attempting  to  capture  it  in  settlement.46  The  one  effect  translates  into  less
frequent settlement bargaining; the latter effect translates into greater bargaining
costs  in  the  event  bargaining  occurs.  Either  effect  may  predominate  in
determining the direction of expected bargaining costs. Thus, increasing a party's
costs of presenting evidence may have the effect of either  raising  or lowering the
process costs of giving that  party the burden ofproof.
Regarding  error costs,  the effect seems unambiguous.  The higher a party's
costs,  the  greater  the  resulting  distortion  in  the  outcome  of  the  case.47
Accordingly, raising one party's cost of presenting evidence increases  the error
costs of  giving that party the burden ofprof. 48
(c)  Amount  at stake. - Now consider what happens  when we increase  the
amount at stake for the party. It then becomes more likely that his threshold for
presenting evidence will be satisfied. As a result, it becomes more likely that the
allocation will generate a surplus (the party's avoided litigation costs)  for the
parties to bargain over. It thus becomes more likely that the parties will engage
in settlement bargaining. Accordingly, an increase in the probability that a party
is  correct has  the effect of raising  the process costs of giving that party the
burden ofproof.
Matters  are  less clear  as  to error  costs.  As the likelihood  increases  that a
party's  threshold  for  presenting  evidence  is  satisfied,  the  second  term  in
Expression  5  may  go  up  or  down,  while  the  first  term  is  unaffected.49
Accordingly, raising the amount at stake for a party may raise  or lower the error
costs of  giving that  party the burden ofproof
(d) Social cost of an erroneous outcome. - Finally, consider what happens
when we raise the cost of an erroneous outcome (the second and/or fourth terms
in Expression 6),  without changing any other parameter.  Here again, this will
have no  effect on the parties'  behavior," 0  and so will have no effect on either
litigation costs or the likelihood  of an  error. Its  only effect  is to increase  the
social loss sustained in the event of an error. Thus, an increase in the social cost
of an erroneous outcome against a given party increases  the error  costs of  giving
that  party the burden ofproof
46. For example, insisting on a 80/20 division of the surplus is worth more if the surplus
is $1 million than if it is $1  thousand; thus, a party will rationally  invest more in seeking such
a split if the surplus is $1 million.
47. The first term in Expression 6 goes down; the second and third terms in Expression 6
go up. Without knowing anything else about the case, we would expect the latter two effects
to dominate the former.
48. As the defendant's cost of presenting evidence increases, the second term in Expression
3 goes up,  while Expression 4 is unaffected. Similarly,  as the plaintiff's  cost of presenting
evidence increases,  the second term in Expression 4 goes up, while Expression 3 is unaffected.
49. The first term in Expression  6 goes up, while the third goes down; there is no way to
know the net effect on the value of Expression 6 (and hence on the value of  Expression 5).
50. See supra  note 31  and accompanying text.
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C. Factors  Bearing  on the Optimal  Allocation
We are now in a position to assess the influence of different case parameters
on the total  costs of a given  allocation  in the model.  Table 4  combines  and
summarizes the comparative-static results just derived."
TABLE 4
EFFECT OF AN INCREASE IN ONE PARAMETER ON THE
TOTAL COSTS OF ALLOCATING THE BURDEN TO A GIVEN PARTY
Increased parameter Effect on total costs
Probability the party is  +
correct
Party's cost of  +
presenting  evidence
Amount at stake for  +
party
Social cost of error  +
against party
VI. THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
We turn now to the problem of identifying the optimal burden allocation in a
given case or class of cases. We have analyzed how different features of a case
affect the costs of a given allocation; our task now is to see how a court would
apply this analysis in practice.
A.  The Model's Prescriptions
1. Factors Bearing on the Optimal Allocation
The model has identified  five features of a case that bear on the costs  of a
given allocation: the probable merits, the parties'  estimates of their chances of
success, the parties'  costs of presenting evidence, the amount at stake for each
party,  and  the  costs  of an  error  in  favor  of one  or  the  other party.  What
information  does the court need to assess these features? Let us consider each in
turn.
(a) Probable  merits. - The court's first task is to estimate the likelihood that
one or the other party is "correct"  in his version of the facts. More precisely, it
51.  My procedure here was the same as for Table 2.
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must estimate  the probability, given what it already knows about  the case, that
a given party is correct. The court, of course, has only limited information about
the  case  before  the  evidence  has  been  presented;  but  it  always  has  some
information-it  knows  something  about the nature  of the dispute,  including
perhaps some  facts that are uncontested between the parties. This information
forms the predicate for estimating the probable merits of the case.
Let  me  give  an  example.  Suppose  the  plaintiff,  a  pedestrian,  sues  the
defendant, a motorist, for injuries sustained in a car accident. The contested issue
in the case is whether the defendant drove negligently; the court must allocate the
burden of proof on this issue. Suppose that all the court knows-at the time it
assigns the burden-is that a car accident occurred. The question for the court
is:  what fraction of car accidents  involve motorist negligence?  This gives the
probability that in this case the defendant was negligent.
5 2
Suppose, instead, that the court knows not only that an accident occurred, but
that  the  defendant  drove  through  the  intersection  (which  the  plaintiff was
crossing)  while the traffic  light was  red. The question  then would be:  what
fraction of car accidents in which the motorist ran a red light involve motorist
negligence?  This  fraction  is  presumably  different  (higher)  than  the  earlier
fraction,  and so would yield a different probability estimate that the defendant
was negligent in this case.
I  will  not  explore  here  the reasoning  process  a  court  must undertake  in
estimating probabilities of this sort.53 The important point for present purposes
is  that  choosing  the cost-minimizing  burden allocation  requires  the court  to
estimate  the  probable  merits  of the  case.  To  do  this,  it must use whatever
information it has at hand when making the allocation.
(b) Party  beliefs. - The court has little means of observing a party's estimate
of his chances of success. It is fair to conjecture, however, that a party's estimate
is  generally positively correlated with the probable merits of the  case (as  the
court sees them). Thus, all else equal, the higher the court's estimate of a claim's
merit, the higher a party's estimate,  and vice versa. 4  To the extent  a party's
estimate  is  a relevant  factor," 5  it moves in the same  direction  as  the court's
estimate of the probable merits.
(c)  Costs of presenting  evidence. - These  include all costs of locating and
assembling evidence  on the contested issue.  With modem rules of discovery,
which  require  parties  to  share  the  evidence  in their  possession  (and  their
knowledge  of the  whereabouts  of  other  evidence),  the  parties'  costs  may
frequently be roughly the same. This is, however, an empirical question; the more
52. Thus, for example, if one in three car accidents of this type involve motorist negligence,
then the court-knowing nothing more than that a car accident occurred--can say only that the
chances  are one in three that negligence was present in this case.
53.  Estimating the probable merits involves a process of Bayesian inference, whose use in
allocating the burden of proof is discussed in more detail in Hay & Spier, supra  note 3.
54. This is not to say that the beliefs are identical, only that upward movement in one is
associated with upward movement in another.
55.  Our earlier analysis showed its significance was ambiguous.
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effective  the  discovery  process  is  in evening  out asymmetries  of access and
information,  the more likely the parties'  costs are to be identical. 6
(d) Amount at stake. - In most cases,  the stakes will be identical  for the
parties. This is generally true where the stakes consist solely of the relief to be
awarded the plaintiff: the plaintiff's gain is the defendant's loss, and vice versa.
In some cases, however, the relief collected by the plaintiff is not the only item
at stake; in such cases, the parties may have different amounts at stake. Examples
include reputational  effects  of an  adverse outcome,17 preclusive  effects of an
adverse judgment, 8 or relief paid to people other than the plaintiff."'
(e)  Social cost of an erroneous outcome. - An  erroneous  imposition  of
liability may or may not have the same  social cost  as an erroneous failure to
impose  liability.  For example,  in some  instances  a false positive (erroneous
imposition of liability) may have costly overdeterrent effects; in other instances
a false positive may have no effect on behavior at all, and therefore generate few
if any social  costs.  Similarly,  a false  negative  (erroneous  failure  to  impose
liability) may have costly underdeterrent effects  in some settings, while having
no effect on behavior in others. The optimal allocation  depends in part on the
court's assessment of these different possibilities.
2. Optimal Burden of Proof Rules
Table 5 summarizes  the  significance  of each  of the above  factors  for  the
desirability of a given burden allocation. One feature-the parties'  beliefs about
the likely outcome of the case-has no clear bearing on the desirability of the
allocation. Regarding the other features,  an increase  in any parameter has the
effect of making the opposite allocation more desirable.
56. Suppose, for example, that the critical piece of  evidence is a document in the plaintiff's
possession. Must the plaintiff hand this document to the defendant, or can she (in practice) bury
it in a pile of documents, forcing the defendant to expend resources in finding it? The answer
bears on the parties'  relative costs of presenting evidence.
57. In a malpractice case, for example, the plaintiff has at stake only her damages; the
defendant has at stake the damages plus his professional reputation.
58. For example, the defendant may face a series of suits with issues in common with the
present one. An adverse ruling in the present case may preclude relitigation of the issue in the
future cases.
59. For example, punitive damages paid to the state rather than to the plaintiff.
60. The cost of erroneous outcomes in litigation is analyzed exhaustively in Louis Kaplow,
The Value ofAccuracy in  Adjudication:  An Economic Analysis, 23 J.  LEGAL STUD.  307 (1994);
see also Posner, supra  note 9, at 400-17.
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TABLE  5
SIGNIFICANCE OF AN INCREASE  IN ONE PARAMETER  FOR THE
DESIRABILITY  OF ALLOCATING  THE BURDEN  TO A GIVEN PARTY
Increased parameter  Significance
Probability the party is  favors  opposite allocation
correct
Party's optimism  inconclusive
Party's cost of presenting  favors opposite allocation
evidence
Amount at stake for party  favors opposite allocation
Social cost of error against  favors  opposite allocation
party
What kind of burden of proof rules does Table 5 imply are desirable? Let us
take, as our baseline, the class of disputes of which the following statements are
true:
'  given what the court knows-or would know, if suit were filed-about the
dispute, the probability that the plaintiff has a meritorious claim for relief is
relatively small;
* the parties'  costs of presenting  evidence are roughly the same; the amount at
stake for each party is roughly the same;  and the social costs of an error in one
or the other party's favor are roughly the same.
In this baseline set of disputes, all of the parameters in Table 5 cancel each other
out, except for the probability that the claim  is meritorious;  and that parameter
favors giving the burden to the plaintiff.
Thus, to return to our earlier auto accident example, suppose that if  a suit were
filed,  all the court would know (at the time  it assigned the burden) is that an
accident  occurred.  If driver negligence  is  involved in  only  a relatively  small
fraction of auto  accidents, then in this dispute the probability that the plaintiff
has a meritorious claim is relatively small. The burden should accordingly  go to
the plaintiff, in this case and in all auto accident  cases in which the court  knows
nothing (at the time of allocating  the burden) beyond the fact that an accident
has occurred.
As  another  example,  suppose  the  case  involves  a  contract  dispute;  the
contested issue is whether the defendant breached the contract. Suppose that, if
suit were filed, all the court would know (at the time of allocating the burden) is
that a business dispute has arisen. If only a relatively small fraction of business
disputes involve an actionable contract breach, then the probability that a breach
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was involved in this case is relatively small. Accordingly, the burden would go
to the plaintiff in all breach of contract  cases in which the court knows nothing
(at  the time of allocating  the burden) beyond the  fact that a business dispute has
arisen.
This type of reasoning applies to any dispute in which the facts known to the
court when  it assigns the burden are such that, without more information, the
court must conclude that the defendant is probably correct. All  else being equal,
the  burden  of proof should go  to the  plaintiff. If most cases  resemble  this
baseline case, then Table 5 implies that as a general  rule, the burden of proof on
contested issues should go to the plaintiff.
Departures from this general rule might then be justified on at least one of four
grounds.  These are:  (1) Based  on the information  available  to the court, the
plaintiff probably has a meritorious claim. (2) The plaintiff's costs of presenting
evidence are higher. (3) The plaintiff has more at stake in the case. (4) An error
in the defendant's favor is more costly than an error in the plaintiff's favor. Any
of these features, if present and sufficiently  strong, would furnish a potential
rationale for giving the defendant the burden.
B. Positive  Implications
To what extent do the prescriptions  in Table  5  conform to the practices of
courts in allocating the burden of proof? The cardinal rule in most settings is of
course that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on most aspects of the case.
How well does this match up with our analysis of Table 5?
Consider the "universe" of all potential disputes over some resource;  all the
potential settings, say, in which one person might seek to extract a payment of
money  from another.  The odds that, within that set, a  given dispute actually
involves  a meritorious  claim for judicial relief are probably  quite small.  For
example:  every  auto  accident  furnishes  a  potential  occasion  for  demanding
money from the motorist;  every business transaction  furnishes an occasion for
one transactor  to  demand  some  payment from the  other; every  activity  of a
landowner gives his neighbor some basis for claiming to have some grievance
against him. Of all the potential disputes that might arise in these settings, the
number involving meritorious claims for relief is probably quite small.
If we assume that the other factors in Table 5 cancel each other out, then there
is a good reason for giving the plaintiff the burden of proof in this "universe" of
potential disputes. In the contract setting, for example, all the court knows at the
beginning of a case is (say) that a business dispute has erupted;  in  a nuisance
case, all the court knows is (say) that two neighboring landowners have gotten
into a tiff. Knowing that and nothing more, the court must conclude  that the
defendant  is probably right (that there is no basis for judicial relief). All else
equal, the plaintiff should get the burden of proof.
What would be wrong with making the opposite allocation in these cases? Two
things,  as we know from the foregoing  analysis. First, in instances where the
parties were uncertain of the facts, the plaintiff would be tempted to sue on the
slimmest of grounds (when her chances of success were very small), compelling
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the defendant to present the evidence.6'  Second, the plaintiff would be tempted
to sue even knowing she had no claim, in the hopes of inducing the defendant to
pay her to  drop the claim.  The resulting process costs  and error costs would
likely be greater than if the plaintiff bore the burden of proof.
The model seems consistent, then, with a general rule of putting the burden of
proof on the plaintiff. Major exceptions to the general rule also track the model.
Courts commonly give the defendant the burden of proof when,  given the facts
available to the court, the probability is high that the plaintiff is correct. The res
ipsa loquitur rule in torts is the best known example; the negligence per se rule
furnishes another instance.62 Another well-known example is the burden-shifting
rules in discrimination cases.63 Most of the "presumptions"  courts employ in civil
cases (such  as the presumption that a mailed  letter reaches its addressee)  are
explicable  on this ground as well."
The relative cost of gathering  evidence may  explain certain exceptions. For
example, some formulations of  the res ipsa rule place weight on the fact that the
defendant had exclusive control of the injury-causing instrument; 65 this might be
justified  on  the ground that  he has better  access  to  information  about what
happened. A similar analysis would explain the rule giving the bailee the burden
of proof in a suit concerning damage to goods under his control.6
Regarding the amount at stake and the costs of error, an interesting example
is that a party asserting fraud bears the burden of proving it.67 The party who  is
accused of fraud may lose a lot of reputational capital if he loses the case; this
loss  may dwarf the  amount  of relief being  sought  in the case,  meaning  the
accused has a lot more at stake than his opponent. It may also be that non-legal
sanctions against fraud are sufficiently  strong that the cost of a false negative is
much smaller than the cost of a false positive."
61.  In contrast, if she bore the burden of proof, the plaintiff would not sue unless she had
fairly substantial grounds for believing the evidence supported her claim; otherwise she would
be wasting resources in presenting the evidence.
62.  In our earlier example, if  the plaintiff can prove the defendant ran a red light, some
courts would say this creates a "presumption"  that the defendant was negligent; the burden then
shifts to the defendant to negate this assumption.
63. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
64. For numerous examples, see FLEMING JAMES,  JR. ET AL.,  CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.17, at
346-52 (4th ed. 1992).
65. See id. § 7.16, at 345.
66. See id. § 7.17, at 349.
67. For our purposes, this rule only has bite when the defendant is the party asserting fraud.
(There are other special rules concerning fraud that affect matters even when the plaintiff has
the burden of proof, but we put these to one side.)
68. This line of argument is strongly implied in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th
Cir. 1990).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Precise judicial evaluation of the costs of a given allocation is of course out of
the  question;  even  in the simplest  of cases,  only  a rough  assessment  of the
expressions derived in this Article is possible. But if the court is concerned with
minimizing the costs of the legal system, even a rough assessment is better than
none at all. My objective has been to provide a framework for carrying out this
task and to suggest the principal factors on which the cost-minimizing  allocation
will depend.